Kennedy and the Congo: The Battle for Africa, Pt. 2

As noted in Part 1, during the campaign of 1960, John Kennedy mentioned Africa 479 times. (Betting on the Africans, by Philip Muehlenbeck, p. 37) He said that America should have gained ground in Africa with these emerging states, but we had not fully allied ourselves with the cause of independence. He criticized the State Department for not stationing enough diplomats there and for too few attempts at cultural exchanges.

There may have been an ingrained bias involved with this reluctance.  In an NSC meeting, of January 1960. Vice-President Richard Nixon stated that “some of the people of Africa have been out of the trees for only about fifty years.” Budget Director Maurice Stans replied that he “had the impression that many Africans still belonged in the trees.” (Muehlenbeck, p. 6). The administration did not think that the African population was mature enough to govern themselves. Therefore there was an ingrained tendency at State to favor  European guidance as long as possible. This allowed the Russians to make some headway, for example in Egypt with Gamal Abdel Nasser. It also allowed the administration to back the French colonial regime in Algeria in a bloody, ugly, ultimately doomed effort that resulted in torture and assassinations. 

While this bloody uprising in Algeria was taking place, the administration sent businessman Clarence Randall to tour the continent. He met exclusively with the European colonial governors. When he returned he stated for the record:

We must publicly draw attention to the great danger to all of Africa that could arise from premature or disorderly independence on the part of an area that is neither politically, socially, nor economically ready for such a changed situation.  We must urge caution. We must be for the evolutionary and not the revolutionary approach to autonomy. (Muehlenebeck, p. 7)

Not trusting the Africans, Nixon spoke of finding a strong man to  rule to stave off communist development in labor unions. This stance was quite salient at the UN in New York City. In his nearly 8 years in office, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles never once cast a vote in support of African independence or self-determination. In fact, in one of the last acts of the Dulles regime, the White House instructed US reps. at the UN to abstain from voting on a resolution for self-determination for the Portuguese colonies e.g. Angola and Mozambique.

Another way that Dulles made his message favoring European leadership was in ignoring many of the most charismatic and articulate young revolutionary leaders.. (Muehlenbeck, p. 9). The key figure in the Middle East was Egypt’s Gamel Abdel Nasser. He was a secularist and a socialist. Dulles wanted him to join the Baghdad Pact.  Nasser said he could not since England would be a silent partner and they were the greatest colonizer in the world. Dulles now turned to Pakistan, Iran and eventually Saudi Arabia.. This was quite inappropriate since Nasser opposed almost everything about Saudi Arabia, especially its sponsoring of the Muslim Brotherhood, a militant group pushing an extreme form of Islam that Nasser was opposed to.  He eventually went to war with that group and either expelled or imprisoned them.

There was a moderating factor involved in all these power changes, since more and more new states were  entering the UN. That moderator was Dag Hammarskjold.  In 1953 he became Secretary General of the UN. In 1957, he was unanimously reelected. Kennedy could not have hoped for a better statesman in that position, or one he could more easily work through.  They both agreed on a main subject: namely with all the new Third World countries coming in, the UN could now become a forum for the powerless against the powerful. Dag tried to mediate disputes between Nasser and Ben Gurion of Israel.  And he stepped into the middle of the Suez Crisis—where Nasser wanted to nationalize the Suez Canal—in order to stop the all-out attack on Egypt by England, Israel and France. This humiliated Prime Minister Anthony Eden of England, who was forced to resign. It raised the profile of Nasser--not just in the Middle East, but throughout the world. After, there was no Arab leader to match his stature and appeal.

But there was another problem that Foster Dulles had with Nasser: Egypt insisted on being non-aligned.  Which was not tolerable to the Secretary of State. With Foster Dulles you were either in the western camp or with Moscow. There was no middle ground. With two strikes against Nasser, Dulles now decided to negate the Aswan Dam deal. Which was Nasser’s key hydroelectric project for Egypt. (Muehlenbeck, pp.12-13)  As John Kennedy predicted, Moscow would now sweep in and claim a huge propaganda victory, which Kennedy thought was simply stupid.

When John Kennedy became president, many of Foster Dulles’ African policies were quickly altered. First, JFK sent Senator Frank Church to the continent in order to report on what the immediate problems and possible solutions were. (Muehlenbeck, p. 41) Church recommended abandoning any fence sitting in favor of supporting African nationalism.

Kennedy’s first appointment at State was Mennen Williams as assistant secretary for African affairs. Williams was strongly liberal and very much in favor of civil rights. He once said that “What we want for the Africans is what the Africans want for themselves.”(Muelhenbeck, p. 45) Kennedy made clear that Williams would now be running Africa policy and not State’s Bureau of Western European Affairs. Kennedy appointed figures as ambassadors who had a strong interest in the Third World, like William Attwood in Guinea, John Badeau in Egypt and Edmund Gullion in Congo.

With these men in place, Kennedy’s revised policies could be enacted. These would be:

1.) To oppose European colonialism

2.) Accept the choice of non-alignment

3.) Institute economic aid for infrastructure, and

4.) Use personal diplomacy to build working relationships.

As we shall see, this last was important in regard to someone Kennedy felt was key, Nasser.

But there was a bomb hidden in Kennedy’s reform package. The previous administration had secretly ordered the assassination of a newly elected leader of an independent African state, namely Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. After 75 years of colonial domination, Belgium had decided to pull out in 1960 and allow for Congolese elections. But they did so in a deliberately abrupt manner. The idea being that due to the shock, it would be easier to then establish informal, yet de facto control afterward.  Before departure, a Belgian commander had written on a chalkboard:

                      Before Independence=After Independence

The Belgians predicted correctly. One of the things that helped the newly freed nation become chaotic was that Belgium had moved Congo’s gold reserves to Brussels prior to independence day. (John Newman, Countdown to Darkness, p. 155) With little cash on hand, Lumumba’s army spun out of control and began to attack the Europeans left behind and pillage their property.

Belgium now started up their preconceived design.  They first enacted a secession plan for the mineral rich state of Katanga, which they would control. They hired a front man, Moise Tshombe, and paid him millions to serve as their secessionist chief. They then began to drop paratroopers into Congo proper. (James DiEugenio, “Dodd and Dulles vs Kennedy in Africa”, Probe, Vol. 6 No. 2)

Lumumba first asked the UN for help. Hammarskjold agreed. But the aid was slow in getting there.  Lumumba then went to Washington to request American aid in removing the Belgians. The reply was deliberately non-committal. Lumumba now took the only route left open: he asked Moscow for aid.  They first responded with medical supplies and food. He then asked for planes, pilots and technicians to use against Katanga. Therefore,, on August 18, 1960, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville—Larry Devlin-- sent a cable to CIA HQ that Congo was now experiencing “a classic Communist effort” to take over the government.  Within 24 hours, both the White House and Allen Dulles set in motion a series of assassination attempts. (John Newman, Countdown to Darkness, pp. 227-34) As Jonathan Kwitny noted, there was never any credible evidence that Lumumba was a communist: ”all through his brief career…he had publicly pledged to respect private property and even foreign investment.” (Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 72)

In a stroke of irony, on the day the plots were hatched, Lumumba made the following radio address to his citizenry:

We know that the US understands us and we are pleased to see the US position in bringing about international peace….If the Congolese place their confidence in the US, which is a good friend, they will find themselves rewarded. (Mahoney, p. 44)

The CIA sent two assassins—code named QJ WIN and WI ROGUE-- to Congo to kill Lumumba.  They also sent Sydney Gottlieb to poison him. Devlin got President Joseph Kasavubu to remove Lumumba, and bribed the chief of the army, Josef Mobutu, to murder him. (Newman, p. 265) At this point Hammarskjold sent his own emissary, Rajeshwar Dayal to protect Lumumba. So when Mobutu tried to arrest Lumumba, Dayal blocked the attempt. This also prevented Lumumba’s deputy from being killed, which Devlin wanted done. (Kwitny, p. 67) Dayal also formally refused to recognize the Kasavubu-Mobutu government. But the American ambassador on the scene, Clare Timberlake went along with the CIA. He called Lumumba a communist and supported the pretenders. So now, Lumumba’s followers set up their own separatist state at Stanleyville. (Op. Cit. DiEugenio)

Dayal placed Lumumba under house arrest surrounded by UN troops in Leopoldville. But then the news came in that, at the request of England and America,  the UN was going to seat the Kasavubu delegation.  On November 27^th, he decided to escape to Stanleyville. At this point, the CIA had decided not to directly murder Lumumba. CIA officer Justin O’Donnell convinced Devlin to instead help the Belgians track him during his escape, and also to help block certain escape routes by setting up check points at various river crossings. QJ Win volunteered to go to Stanleyville and assassinate him. But this became unnecessary when he was subsequently captured on December 1^st. He was then transferred to Thysville prison. (Newman, p. 293-96)

He was deceived there when certain leaders, including Mobutu, told him he was being returned to Leopoldville. In reality he was being transferred to Elizabethville in Katanga. He was beaten up on the flight there, his face and head bashed by rifle butts.  He was blindfolded when he got off the plane and driven to a secluded wooded spot 30 miles away.  On January 17^th he was executed by firing squad.  His body was rolled into a pit and covered with dirt.  When that site was discovered, the body was dug up and moved to a different location and reburied.  On January 26^th, it was dug up again. The corpse was cut up and dissolved in sulphuric acid. When the acid ran out the remnants were burned. The process took 48 hours. (Newman, p. 296)

Lumumba became a hero in Africa. Up and down the continent, one finds his name affixed to avenues, squares, parks and schools.( Kwitny, p. 71) The man attained this stature not because he was a communist or even a socialist, or because he promoted either one.  He did not. But because he tried to stop foreign intervention. And the two main interventionists were Belgium and the United States.  As Jonathan Kwitny noted, “the democratic experiment had no example in Africa, and badly needed one.”  Instead, the first coup in postcolonial Africa, and the first assassination in a major country was aided and abetted by the USA. And by doing so  a legally constituted republic was overturned.

 Instead, when it was all over, and Lumumba, and Hammarskjold and Kennedy were all assassinated—within the space of 4 years--a plundering despot took over.  He stayed in power for three decades. Josef Mobutu robbed the country and turned it into a failed state. From which it has never recovered.